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Abstract 
Multilateralism today faces numerous challenges. This article offers some reflections on those 
challenges—what they are and how they originated—and how multilateralism can be 
reinvigorated. It argues that though multilateralism is not a panacea, many of the critical 
challenges that confront humanity today—biodiversity, cybersecurity, global warming, mass 
migration, arms proliferation, and the regulation of outer space, as well as the spread of 
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In what follows I offer some errant reflections on challenges for multilateralism in a pre-post-
COVID world. I need not remind readers that even before COVID-19, we were living in 
challenging times for the multilateral system. In the United Kingdom, where I work and reside, 
the agony of Brexit—the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the European Union—posed, 
and continues to pose, its own set of challenges for multilateralism, in Europe and more 
widely.1 In Brazil, historically a strong proponent of multilateralism among emerging powers, 
multilateralism under Jair Bolsonaro has taken a backseat to a “Brazil First” policy, which has 
abandoned any pretense of global responsibility for the protection of the Amazon.2 In Russia, 
under Vladimir Putin, support for multilateralism has often been used as a vehicle for 
advancing narrow national interests over broader organizational goals and purposes.3 And 
everywhere in the world, the assault on the multilateral system by the US government under 
the presidency of Donald Trump was dramatic and, in some respects, unprecedented. I could 
go on: My examples are meant only to be illustrative; sadly, they are not exhaustive. 
It is important to distinguish the assault on multilateralism from other adverse trends that 
we have been witnessing, in particular the rise in authoritarianism, which has been occurring 
at the same time. The year 2019 marked the fourteenth consecutive year of decline in global 
freedoms, according to Freedom House.4 Similarly, the Economist Intelligence Unit’s 
(EIU) Democracy Index for 2019 reveals that democratic rights around the globe are at their 
lowest point since the survey was first launched in 2006.5 Of the 165 countries that the EIU 
surveyed, only 22 are “full democracies,” while more than a third live under authoritarianism. 
It is important to distinguish authoritarianism from challenges to multilateralism because 
authoritarianism is not necessarily incompatible with multilateralism. Take Russia, an 
authoritarian state under Putin. As Alexander Gabuev and Elena Chernenko, two analysts with 
the Carnegie Moscow Center, observe, “Russia does not actually want to see the rules-based 
multilateral order erode.”6 When Putin and other senior Russian officials express their support 
for the central role of the United Nations, they are not just paying lip service to multilateralism. 
The United Nations is an important forum for Russia. “As a veto-wielding permanent member 
of the UN Security Council—and as a formidable military power—Russia exercises a lot of 
influence there,” Gabuev and Chernenko point out. Russia may not exercise that influence in 
support of democratic freedoms and human rights but neither does it seek a world in which 
there are no institutional constraints on power—other states’ power, that is—however weak 
those constraints may be. 
Another caveat: Though I am talking about the challenges for multilateralism as a matter 
of concern, we need to remember that multilateralism is not necessarily, in all cases, a good 
thing. The 1956 invasion of Egypt by Britain, France, and Israel—the Suez Crisis—was an act 
of multilateralism and it was not a good thing (and not because it failed). The 2003 invasion of 
Iraq led by the United States, Britain, Australia, and Poland was also an act of multilateralism 
and it too was not a good thing. Sometimes multilateralism is just a cover for great powers to 
do not-so-great things that they would find awkward to do entirely on their own. That’s because 
multilateralism confers varying degrees of legitimacy even if that legitimacy is sometimes only 
paper thin.7 
Let us also not forget that international cooperation, the underpinning of multilateralism, 
does not eliminate or override international competition. We have seen evidence of that in the 
efforts to fight the COVID pandemic. At the same time that scientists of all nationalities were 
working together to produce a vaccine, states were vying with each other to be the first in line 
to obtain these vaccines for their own populations—what has been described as “vaccine 
nationalism.” The multilateral organization that should have been coordinating international 
efforts to produce a vaccine, the World Health Organization (WHO), was forced to redesign 
its global COVID-19 vaccine procurement facility, known as Covax, because rich and powerful 
states were favoring bilateral deals over support for the facility, which was created to ensure 
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an equitable distribution of vaccines worldwide.8 This, by the way, is the same organization 
that the Trump administration announced, in July 2020, that the United States would be 
withdrawing from, thus threatening to deprive it of vital funding—some 22 percent of its core 
budget—at a time when the world was facing one of the most serious health crises in the 
organization’s history. This announcement followed earlier decisions by the Trump 
administration to withdraw the United States from the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization (UNESCO), the Paris Agreement on climate change, and the Open Skies treaty 
on overflight reconnaissance, among other multilateral accords. 
It is important to bear in mind also that the challenges to multilateralism have not all 
originated from without. Multilateralism, as it has been practiced, has sometimes carried within 
it its own seeds of decay. In a recent book, Vivien Schmidt dissects the European Union’s 
“crisis of legitimacy,” pinpointing the European Union’s preoccupation with rules rather than 
with the welfare of its member states to explain why the Eurozone crisis from 2009 so seriously 
tarnished the European Union’s reputation and weakened support for the organization.9 Others 
have decried the European Union’s democratic deficit, the fact that many European citizens do 
not feel that they are adequately represented in European decision making and that the 
European Union is insufficiently accountable. In a survey of ten European countries in 2018 
by the Pew Research Center, an average of 62 percent of those surveyed said that the European 
Union “does not understand the needs of its citizens.”10 That’s not a pretty picture. 
It could be argued, however, that some of the disruptions that we are witnessing are only 
momentary—that with the passing of the Trump administration, for instance, we can now 
expect to see a partial reversal of the US retreat from multilateralism. That has proved to be 
true. With the election of Joe Biden as US president, his administration has taken a less 
unilateralist approach to international relations. In one of his first acts as president, Biden 
retracted Trump’s decision to withdraw from WHO. But the problem is that some of the 
damage to multilateralism has already been done and will not be easy to reverse. Take arms 
control. Having dismantled some of the pillars of the international architecture that has kept 
the nuclear peace, regionally and globally, the United States is not finding it easy to put those 
pillars back in place. For instance, the United States is seeking to rejoin the Iran nuclear deal 
(the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action) that the Obama-Biden administration negotiated and 
that Trump repudiated—the deal that arguably helped to restrain the development of an Iranian 
nuclear arsenal. But it may be too late: It is not clear that Iran wishes to reaffirm its commitment 
to an arrangement that is predicated on the goodwill of its signatories after the United States 
failed to honor its commitments.11 Similarly, the US withdrawal from the Intermediate-Range 
Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), which for three decades has constrained the United States and 
Russia from deploying short- and intermediate-range nuclear missiles, represents another fatal 
blow to a critical component of the nuclear arms control regime. It may not be easy, or possible 
at all, to reverse the damage done to this regime. 
Just to round out the picture, in the age of COVID-19, at the same time that we are 
witnessing assaults on the multilateral system we are also witnessing stepped-up support for 
multilateralism. Israel and Palestine provided an encouraging example in the early stages of 
the pandemic. As a forthcoming study by the Israeli Institute for National Security Studies 
reports: 
[The pandemic] underscored the mutually dependent relations between Israel and the 
Palestinian Authority [PA]. Realizing that the collapse of the PA could have a dire 
impact on its own security, Israel expended unusual and significant efforts to help the 
PA face the coronavirus threat. During the first wave of the pandemic both sides jointly 
implemented practical measures to keep the situation under control at home and next 
door. These measures included co-ordination between the Ministries of Health of the 
PA and Israel. Joint training sessions for medical personnel were organized and 
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information and medical supplies were distributed to the Palestinian public by Israel; 
extra funds were released by Israel to the Palestinian Authority and in joint 
coordination, tens of thousands of Palestinian workers were permitted to remain in 
Israel to continue working under certain conditions.12 
The report concludes: “The Covid-19 pandemic is a clarion call for environment-based threats 
requiring coordination across jurisdictions to mitigate threats to national health, prosperity and 
security.” Sadly, these same insights were not applied by the Israeli authorities at the 
vaccination stage, when Palestinians in the Occupied Territories were excluded from the 
campaign.13 
It is evident, then, that if the challenges to multilateralism are real, so, too, are the prospects 
for meeting those challenges, even among adversaries. What can be done to strengthen 
multilateralism? One of the curious things is that despite what some national leaders may be 
saying against multilateral efforts and against multilateral institutions, public opinion in 
support of multilateralism and the UN system in particular is high and has been consistently so 
for many years—well before Trump was elected and throughout his time in office. According 
to the Pew Research Center, “Across 32 countries surveyed in 2019, an average of 61 percent 
expressed a positive view of the United Nations while an average of just 26 percent expressed 
a negative view.”14 That’s a significant level of support. In the United States specifically, nearly 
60 percent of those surveyed expressed a favorable opinion of the United Nations.15 A separate 
poll conducted on behalf of the Better World Campaign in September 2020 found that a 
whopping 85 percent of Americans surveyed expressed the view that the United Nations is 
either “very important” or “somewhat important,” with 73 percent maintaining that it is an 
organization that is still needed today.16 Similarly, when surveyed in 2019 about the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 77 percent, or nearly eight in ten Americans, said that 
being a member of NATO is good for the United States.17 These votes of confidence in 
multilateralism are not just a recent phenomenon; this has been the pattern for many years.  
What these figures tell us is that the assault on multilateralism is often not driven by or in 
response to popular demand. The public, on the whole, is not hostile to multilateralism. To the 
contrary, there is popular support for multilateralism. Part of the problem is that, whether 
viewed favorably or not, the work of international organizations—especially their 
achievements—is not always well known or well enough understood. Multilateral 
organizations often do a bad job of communicating to the general public what they do. And the 
media do not give them much attention either or, when they do, they give these multilateral 
organizations a disproportionate amount of bad press. Another problem is that while the general 
public may be favorably disposed toward multilateralism, increasingly it is a partisan issue: In 
the United States, for instance, Democrats tend to have a more positive view of the United 
Nations than Republicans do, and that partisan gap has been growing.18 The partisan divide 
makes public opinion more susceptible to manipulation. Perhaps this explains the lack of public 
appreciation for the work of WHO, which Trump railed against, during the pandemic. 
According to the Pew Research Center, the US public gave lower marks to WHO for its 
pandemic response than it did its own national health authorities. When polled in April/May 
2020, 72 percent of US adults surveyed said national public health officials such as those at the 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention were doing a good job in dealing with the 
pandemic, whereas just 46 percent of Americans gave WHO positive marks.19 Does this reflect 
a lack of understanding of what WHO does? Or was it evidence of Trump’s negative messaging 
getting through? Or both? 
If the problem, in part, is a lack of understanding, one thing that can be done to address 
the problem is to develop ways of increasing public awareness of the work of the United 
Nations, the European Union, and other multilateral institutions. I appreciate that that is no 
easy task. If only the answer were to produce more academic studies on the multilateral system, 
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we academics could look forward to getting a much better return on our grant applications. On 
a more serious note, maybe this is where our primary and secondary schools could be doing a 
better job. Target 4.7 of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) calls for the 
mainstreaming of what it calls “global citizenship education” in national education policies, 
curricula, teacher education, and student assessment. Focusing more attention on the work of 
international organizations in our schools is an ambition that is certainly consistent with this 
target. 
Another idea that is gaining traction is the notion of “inclusive multilateralism.” UN 
Secretary-General António Guterres used the term in his address to the General Assembly in 
2019. If multilateral institutions seem remote and out of touch with the public, he stated, then 
more should be done to include the public in the work of these organizations. That means 
“closer contacts with businesses, civil society, and other stakeholders.”20 How might this be 
achieved? Digital technologies today offer unprecedented opportunities for various 
constituencies to weigh in on a whole host of issues, as the pandemic has made clear.21 But to 
be effective these constituencies need to feel that their voices genuinely matter. The difficulty 
is that states are often reluctant to yield space to nonstate actors. Formal participation in 
intergovernmental organizations, however, is not the only way to influence the work of these 
organizations. We’ve seen a flourishing of joined-up civic action across the globe in recent 
years—against racism, against climate change, against sexual violence—and many of these 
efforts have had considerable effect on multilateral efforts.  
My last thought, but not the last word, on reinvigorating multilateralism is the importance 
of leadership. It is a hackneyed term, I realize, but if you contrast how national leaders 
welcomed the advent of multilateralism following World War II with the disdain or even just 
the disregard with which many leaders treat those same institutions today, the difference is 
striking. It would be naïve to think that the early optimism at the end of World War II could 
have been sustained indefinitely. But leaders set the tone for how their publics view the 
international institutions of which their states are members. UN Secretary-General Boutros 
Boutros-Ghali once quipped that the letters “SG” in his title stood not for “Secretary-General” 
but for “scapegoat.” And, indeed, it has become very convenient for national leaders to 
scapegoat the United Nations and other multilateral organizations for their own failings as 
heads of state, thus facilitating the retreat from multilateralism that we have been observing. 
Again, look at Trump’s rubbishing of WHO. But there are also lots of examples of positive 
leadership in this regard. The question is how to promote these good practices. These are hard 
problems with no easy answers. 
To conclude, multilateralism is not a panacea and multilateral organizations are not 
without their weaknesses, some of them very serious. But it is an illusion to think that many of 
the advances that humanity has made—the eradication of smallpox and polio, the dramatic 
reduction of the ozone hole, the lifting of millions of people out of poverty, the elimination of 
entire classes of lethal weapons, and many others—could have been achieved by states acting 
on their own. And it is an illusion to think that many of the critical challenges that lie ahead—
biodiversity, cybersecurity, global warming, mass migration, arms proliferation, and the 
regulation of outer space, as well as the spread of infectious diseases, among others—can be 
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